

Practical Forward Secrecy to Enable Encrypted Cloud Emails

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Article Info

Received: 17-01-2022 Revised: 21 -01-2022 Accepted: 06-02-2022

Published:13/03//2022

ABSTRACT :Cloud computing provides a versatile and practical way to share data, with many benefits for both people and society. The security feature known as forward secrecy has become both desired and essential for users and cloud email service providers to improve the security of cloud email systems due to the increasing use of cloud emails and the regular reports of large-scale email leaks. Conventional methods of achieving forward secrecy, such forward-secure public-key encryption and Diffie-Hellman key exchange, have not been widely approved and implemented because they simultaneously fall short of the security and usability requirements of email systems. In this research, we provide forward-secure puncturable identity-based encryption (fs-PIBE), a novel cryptographic primitive that preserves the forward secrecy of encrypted cloud email systems without compromising their usability. It enables the fine-grained revocation of decryption capabilities for an email user. A concrete fs-PIBE structure with a constant ciphertext size and shown security is used to instantiate the framework we build for encrypted cloud email systems in the standard model. To increase the security and effectiveness of the framework that is being given, we extend the suggested fs-PIBE scheme to provide end-to-end encryption and outsourced decryption, respectively.

KEYWORDS: Secure Cloud Email, Identity-based Encryption, Broadcast Encryption, Encrypted cloud emails, forward secrecy, puncturable encryption, identity-based encryption, end-to-end security.

INTRODUCTION

Despite the rise of various secure communications plat-forms, email remains one of the most popular ways to communicate. While mail server transit security is beneficial against some types of attackers, it does not provide reliable security guarantees for email confidentiality or authenticity. Reports of widespread data collecting operations by nation - state actors, large-scale email server breaches exposing millions of emails, and attackers accessing email accounts to search the emails for important data demonstrate that transport security alone is insufficient. In such cases, end-to-end encryption is used to protect user data. With end-to-end encryption, the email infrastructure becomes essentially a transportation service for opaque email data, and no compromise should affect the security of an end-to-end encrypted email — separate from the sender and receiver endpoints. Encryption is a simple way to protect data security and confidentiality. Because it uses a compact public key infrastructure, identity-based encryption is one of the most promising representative safe techniques. The data owner would like to share the identity-based encrypted data with others in specific instances when storing it in the cloud. Email's widespread use provides great convenience to people's daily communications, but it also poses a serious threat to people's personal privacy. This is due to the fact that email messages frequently include sensitive information, and large-scale cyber-attacks on email networks are becoming more common. In recent years, email data breaches have been recognised as one of the leading causes of important data loss in financial, legal, and

professional companies. OpenPGP and S/MIME, the standards for encrypting emails, have been around for more than two decades. They use a hybrid encryption model. To put it another way, the email sender produces a random session key before using a symmetric encryption algorithm to encrypt the email content. Despite numerous improvements to the efficiency and security of these two protocols, most practical email systems do not use them due to the issue.

Public key infrastructures (PKIs) are required for their deployment, and each user must maintain a public key certificate issued by a trusted authority. The term "identity-based encryption" (IBE) was initially used to refer to key management in the context of public key encryption. It allows users to use any string as their public keys, such as identity numbers and email addresses, and therefore is closer to the practical scenario of email senders using a simple and meaningful string rather than a signed public key certificate to identify the intended receiver. IBE is recognised as an ideal building block for encrypted email systems due to its numerous features. To achieve forward secrecy of encrypted emails, early developments of secure email systems used this method. The difficulty of synchronisation, however, limits this basic strategy. To put it another way, it necessitates that all players log on at the same time. The use of forward-secure public key encryption, as proposed by Canetti et al., is another appealing method for establishing forward secrecy in email systems. The entire lifetime of an email system is divided into distinct time intervals using their technique, during which each email user utilises various secret

keys thanks to a key evolution process, but their public keys remain intact. This situation brings up the most serious issue we face in our work. How to enable forward secrecy in cloud emails that are encrypted.

A. Motivation

With the growing usage of cloud email and numerous instances of large-scale email leakage events, the risk of large-scale email leakage is increasing. While mail server transit security is beneficial against some types of attackers, it does not provide reliable security guarantees for email confidentiality and authenticity. Reports of widespread data gathering attempts by nation-state actors, large-scale email server breaches exposing millions of emails, or attackers accessing email accounts to search the emails for important data highlight the fact that transport security alone is insufficient. The forward secrecy can guarantee the confidentiality of those previously encrypted emails even if the user's secret key gets exposed. So that we introduce a new cryptographic primitive named forward-secure puncturable identity-based encryption (fs-PIBE) which enables an email user to perform fine-grained revocation of decryption capacity.

B. Objectives

- To do an extensive study of Enabling (End-to-End) Encrypted Cloud Emails With Practical Forward Secrecy.
- To work on Encrypted Cloud Emails We offer a new cryptographic primitive called forward-secure puncturable identity-based encryption (fs-PIBE), which allows an email user to perform fine-grained revocation of decryption power to capture forward secrecy of encrypted cloud email systems without sacrificing practicability.
- To Design of a forward-secure puncturable identity-based encryption (fs-PIBE), we build a

framework of encrypted cloud email systems, and instantiate it with a concrete fs-PIBE construction that has constant size of ciphertext and provable security in the standard model..

- To improve the security and efficiency we introduce a new cryptographic primitive forward-secure puncturable identity-based encryption (fs-PIBE).

LITERATURE SURVEY

D. Poddebniak et al: In this paper, We describe new approaches for revealing the plaintext of encrypted emails based on a technique called malleability gadgets. To inject malicious plaintext snippets into encrypted emails, we use CBC/CFB devices. After decryption, these snippets take advantage of existing and standard complying backchannels to exfiltrate the complete plaintext. Using HTML, CSS, and X.509 functionality, we describe malleability gadgets for emails. The attack is started when the recipient decrypts a single maliciously designed email from the attacker, and it works even if the emails were acquired a long time ago.

P. Xu et al: This paper presented a Conditional Identity-based Broadcast Proxy Re Encryption (CIBPRE), as well as its IND-sID-CPA security definitions, is a novel sort of PRE idea. The CIBPRE is a generic notion that includes Conditional PRE (CPRE), Identity-based PRE (IPRE), and Broadcast PRE capabilities (BPRE). The IND-sID-CPA security definition of CIBPRE incorporated the CPRE, IPRE, and BPRE security standards.

H. Li et al: In this study, We presented a concrete dIBAEKS system and introduced the concept of designated-server identity-based authenticated encryption with keyword search. On the basis of a basic number-theoretic assumption, we demonstrated that it is secure against inside offline KGA and achieves required testability. To satisfy the CCA-type designated testability, the scheme could be slightly altered. We also demonstrated how to improve the scheme's efficiency by modifying it to operate with asymmetric bilinear pairing. To ensure users' privacy, dIBAEKS can be used with an encrypted email system. However, because both ciphertexts and trapdoors are linked to the identity of the sender, our dIBAEKS and dIBAEKS-3 schemes have the property that a trapdoor can only be used to search across ciphertexts received by a certain sender.

J. Wei et al: In this paper, We developed a concept called RS-IBE to build a cost-effective and secure data sharing system in cloud computing, which allows identity revocation and ciphertext update simultaneously, preventing a revoked user from accessing previously shared data as well as subsequent shared data. In addition, a concrete RS-IBE construction is shown. Under the decisional l-DBHE assumption, the suggested RS-IBE technique is shown to be adaptively safe in the standard model.

C. Ge et al: In this work, we defined revocable identity-based broadcast proxy re-encryption, proposed a concrete construction under the definition and proved our scheme is CPA secure in the random oracle model. Our proposed solution is efficient and practicable, as evidenced by the property and performance comparison. Furthermore, our RIB-BPRE technique can be used to facilitate key revocation in a cloud context for a data-sensitive system, such as a volunteer-based genome research system. While this research has solved the problem of key revocation for data sharing, it has also raised several fascinating open questions, such as how to design a RIB-BPRE scheme without random oracles and how to support more expressive identities.

D. Derler et al: In this paper, We presented Bloom filter encryption as a type of puncturable encryption that tolerates a non-negligible correctness mistake. We demonstrated a variety of BFKEM structures. The first is a straightforward and highly efficient design based on concepts from the Boneh–Franklin IBE. It creates public keys with a fixed size. The second is a generic ciphertext construction based on CP-ABEs, in which a proper choice of CP-ABE results in constant size ciphertexts. However, in existing systems, those constant-size ciphertexts come at the expense of larger keys. The third is a general IBBE-based architecture that can be created with Delerabee's IBBE. This instantiation simultaneously yields constant size ciphertexts and compact public keys.

S. Krenn et al: In this study, We look at forward secrecy, which is an appealing cryptographic

characteristic for PRE. The proxy in our forward-secret PRE (fs-PRE) specification updates the re-encryption keys on a regular basis and permanently deletes previous copies, while the delegator's public key remains constant. As a result, ciphertexts from previous periods can no longer be re-encrypted and, more importantly, cannot be decrypted at the delegatee's end. Delegators' secret keys evolve as well, therefore they won't be able to decrypt old ciphertexts after their key material from previous periods has been lost. This has direct use in short-term data/message-sharing contexts, as we will demonstrate.

T. V. X. Phuong et al: In this paper, We introduce a Puncturable Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme for asynchronous communication that supports forward secrecy. Because a participant safely delegated computational demand operations to interact with numerous parties to a proxy, the proposed technique is well-suited to many-to-many communication, such as a group messaging service (i.e. a message server). As a result, it enables a large number of people to communicate effectively in a group setting.

S.-F. Sun et al: In this study, A generic method for creating public-key puncturable key encapsulation mechanisms is proposed. By combining it with the usual decapsulation approach, we gain the first modular way of constructing full-blown puncturable encryption with minor correctness issues. Finally, we offer a key-homomorphic identity-based revocable key encapsulation mechanism with expanded correctness, which is a new notion in identity-based revocable encryption. We also describe a number of different implementations of the novel concept, resulting in four distinct public-key puncturable encryption systems.

S. Garg et al: In this work, We introduce the concept of registration-based encryption (RBE), which aims to eliminate the necessity for parties to invest trust in the private-key generator in an IBE scheme. Users sample their own public and secret keys in an RBE scheme. There will also be a "key curator" whose sole responsibility will be to collect all of the registered users' public keys and update the "short" public parameter whenever a new user joins the system. Encryption of a specific recipient can still be done using the recipient's identification as well as any public parameters published after the recipient's registration. Decryption necessitates the usage of certain supplementary data to link users' public (and secret) keys to public parameters.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, We offer a novel cryptographic fundamental called forward-secure puncturable identity-based encryption technique to capture practical forward secrecy of cloud email systems, which does not require the assistance of PKIs or the synchronisation of the email sender and receiver. To be more specific, we clarify the syntax and security concept of fs-PIBE before presenting a framework for encrypted cloud email systems.

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